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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effect of globalisation on governance in 51 African countries for 
the period 1996-2011. Four bundled governance indicators and four globalisation (political, 
economic, social and general) variables are used. The empirical evidence is based on 
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions. The motivation for the estimation technique is 
that blanket governance-globalisation policies are not likely to succeed unless they are 
contingent on initial levels of governance and tailored differently across countries with low, 
intermediate and high levels of governance. The following findings are established. First, 
globalisation promotes good governance. Second, for the most part, the effect of globalisation 
is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the political, institutional and 
general governance distributions. Third, the impact of globalisation is overwhelmingly higher 
in terms of magnitude in the top quantiles of the economic governance distribution.  
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1. Introduction 
 There are five main reasons for engaging this inquiry, namely: (i) growing levels of 
poverty in Africa, the role of good governance in the reduction of poverty and the influence of 
globalisation in the quality of institutions in developing countries; (ii) gaps and debates in the 
literature on the globalisation-governance nexus; (iii) evolving paradigms in the conception 
and measurement of governance and (iv) the need to account for initial levels of governance 
in the modelling exercise in order to provide more targeted policy implications.  
 First, poverty has been increasing in Africa since the 1990s. This was revealed by  a 
2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which established that 
extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa 
where, 45% of Sub-Saharan African countries were substantially off-track from reaching the 
MDG extreme poverty target (see Beegle et al., 2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017a). This 
evidence of extreme poverty is in sharp contradiction with the narrative that for over two 
decades, Africa has been enjoying a growth resurgence (see Fosu 2015a,  44). Moreover, 
good governance has been documented to be instrumental in mitigating extreme poverty 
(Fosu 2015b, 2015c)1 and the process of globalisation also influences the quality of 
governance in developing countries (Lalountas, Manolas and Varouras 2011; Asongu 
2014a)2.  
 Some of the documented mechanisms via which globalisation influences nations’ 
governance include the transmission of individual and social values that are associated with a 
plethora of interactions of nationalities and backgrounds (Jensen and Oster 2009; Berggren 
and Nilsson 2015). These values influence the orientation of individuals in leadership and 
could also affect how the perceptions of institutional and governance structures are shaped. 
Checks and balances between countries can also be shaped by globalisation such that, nations 
with less effective governance structures are assessed by other nations involved in bilateral or 
multilateral trade. Ultimately, such mutual oversight is transmitted to enhance governance 
structures among countries that are linked by mechanisms of globalisation. In addition, the 
growing technology that has been fuelling globalisation can enable countries with low levels 
                                                          
1
 There is an abundant supply of literature on the linkage between good governance and inclusive development. 
Good governance is important in establishing strong foundations of social change (Efobi 2015) and raising 
standards of living through more effective management of economic resources (Fosu 2013; Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor 2014; Fonchingong 2014).  
2
 According to Tchamyou (2016), globalisation is a process that is ineluctable and can only be neglected by 
jeopardizing the prosperity of nations.  
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of governance to catch-up their counterparts with higher levels of governance (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2016a). For example, corruption can be better managed via information 
exchange on corporations between countries and individuals with some track records of 
corruption. 
 Second, the globalisation-governance nexus is still subject to intense debate. 
Accordingly, in spite of the hypothesised positive effect of globalisation on governance 
standards, controversies are apparent in the literature on the role of globalisation in improving 
governance structures. For example, McMillan (2013) has established that institutional 
reforms in Africa have been driven by globalisation. The positive role of globalisation in 
governance has been established in a broad sample of developing (Lalountas, Manolas and 
Varouras 2011) and African (Asongu 2014a) countries. Conversely, with progress in 
technology that is driven by globalisation, poor governance has been observed to escalate 
because of growing networks of individuals and countries. These networks constitute complex 
webs of corruption that are hard to monitor (Goredema 2009; Shapiro and Levine 2015).  
 Third, the conception of governance has evolved in recent literature, especially with 
respect to the debate on the Washington Consensus (that prioritises political governance) 
versus the Beijing model (which prioritises economic governance) (see Asongu 2016a; 
Asongu and Ssozi 2016). On the one hand, the notion of governance has been used without a 
comprehensive conception and measurement. For example, “corruption-control” which is an 
aspect of institutional governance has been used by Kangoye (2013) as “governance”.  On the 
other hand, the concepts of institutional, political, economic and general governances have 
been used in the literature without a comprehensive measurement (Kaufman, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi 2007a, 2017b). This has resulted in conceptually flawed notions of governance and 
statistically falsifiable inferences. For example, it is conceptually inappropriate to use the term 
“economic governance” unless it translates a composite variable that is composed of 
government effectiveness and regulation quality. We address this conceptual shortcoming by 
using four bundled governance indicators, namely: institutional governance (consisting of the 
rule of law and corruption-control); economic governance (entailing regulation quality and 
government effectiveness); political governance (encompassing “voice and accountability” 
and “political stability/non violence”) and general governance (comprising institutional, 
economic and political governances). Hence, general governance is an embodiment of the six 
dimensions of governance.  
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 Fourth, it is important to account for initial levels of governance in the assessment of 
the governance-globalisation nexus because blanket governance-globalisation policies are not 
very likely to be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of governance and 
tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance.  
In the light of the above, this inquiry contributes to the literature by assessing the role 
of globalisation in governance. More comprehensive concepts of governance are employed, 
with particular emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance. 
The research question addressed is the following: how does globalisation affect governance 
when existing levels of governance matter? In order to address this question, two main 
methodological steps are considered. First, we use bundled concepts of governance by means 
of principal component analysis. Second, quantile regressions are employed which enable the 
study to assess the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of governance.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical evidence on the relationship between governance and 
globalisation. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3 while Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence  
 We discuss two main strands in this section, namely: (i) the nexus between governance 
and globalisation and (ii) factors connecting globalisation to governance which are engaged in 
three strands.  The strands are discussed in chronological order.  
First, with regard to the relationship between governance and globalisation, an 
important concern that is worthwhile to articulate is that globalisation affects the perceptions 
of governance within a country. According to Klitgaard (1988) and Asongu, Efobi and 
Tchamyou (2018), poor governance is very likely to be entrenched in the presence of 
monopolistic power which is often characterised with discretion and low accountability. Poor 
governance and mismanagement are not so apparent in countries in which economic 
incentives are the outcome of perfect competition.  Under this scenario, poor governance can 
be reduced when economic operators depend on the discretions of some officials and/or when 
economic agents and governments operating monopolies are within strict rules of 
accountability (Asongu 2014a). It has also been documented that the protestant ethic, 
especially from a political perspective is generally linked to higher levels of governance (see 
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Bonaglia, Macedo and Bussolo 2001; Treisman 2000)3. Conversely, poor governance is more 
detrimental within the framework of federalism, when a country’s democratic basis is less 
open, especially to international trade (Klitgaard 1998). 
 Second, with regard to factors connecting globalisation to governance, according to 
Bonaglia, Macedo and Bussolo (2001) and Krueger (1974), financial and trade globalisation 
could determine the equilibrium between benefits and costs, through a number of theoretical 
channels which we discuss in three main channels. The first mechanism emphasises rent-
seeking activities that are caused by trade restrictions. Contrary to quotas, tariffs and some 
official permission, imports are associated with substantial economic rents owing to 
monopolistic powers that legal importers are endowed with. In attempts to share such rents, 
agents within an economy could either compete on legal terms or take part in illegal rent-
seeking, smuggling, corruption, black market participation and bribery. It has been 
demonstrated by Krueger (1974) that such activities of rent-seeking could constraint some 
economic activities to evolve below optimal thresholds. This could also generate some 
differences between private and social costs and therefore, result in additional welfare costs, 
in addition to tariff restrictions. The seminal idea of Krueger was generalised in subsequent 
studies to a theory of tariffs (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980) and profit-motivated activities 
that are not productive (Bhagwati 1982).  
 The relationship between corruption and trade restrictions has been investigated by 
Gatti (1999). The author has disentangled two effects of inward-oriented corruption policies, 
namely: direct policy distortion and foreign competition. High barriers to international trade 
have a direct influence on the capacity of public officials to exchange “foreign competition 
and policy distortion” for bribes. Ultimately, this engenders low competition between 
domestic and foreign firms which is conducive for high rent-seeking, corruption and poor 
management.  
 The second strand on the competition-decreasing mechanism has been discussed by 
Ades and Di Tella (1999). They dispute that from specific and general perspectives, the 
degree of rent-seeking in markets affect aspects of poor governance. The authors have gone 
further to postulate that since variations in the level of rents are also traceable to the intensity 
competition, such competition should affect corruption in various ways. For instance, an 
                                                          
3
 The protestant ethic is generally more associated with liberalism, capitalism, private property rights and need 
hold the executive accountable (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016). According to the narrative, Weber argued that 
capitalism in Northern Europe was fundamentally promoted by the desire for people to work in a more secular 
world: accumulating investment and wealth from the development of free enterprise and trade.  
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environment that is characterised with low competition (and hence, high rents) can increase 
the quantity of bribes obtained by bureaucrats. Conversely, within the same analytical 
framework, a country would receive more development rewards by augmenting the 
accounting and monitoring of its bureaucracy. According to the authors, it is important to 
compute the net effect of dimensions of poor governance (e.g. corruption). This is essentially 
because opposing tendencies are apparent. Nigeria is used by the authors to illustrate an 
eloquent example of how rent-seeking and corruption are associated. Accordingly, for more 
than three decades, approximately 75% of government revenue has been from petroleum 
exports (Nworu, 2017). During the same period, construction and import booms have been for 
the most part skewed in favour of elites from the ruling class. This nexus confirms a 
hypothetical connection between poor governance and rent-seeking.   
 A third mechanism that can link globalisation to governance takes into account of the 
costs incurred in overseeing public agents owing to growing international integration (see Wei 
2000). The idea underpinning this channel is that the consolidation of institutional quality as 
well as its capacity to ameliorate the standards of governance considerably depends on 
resources that are meant for the purpose. In essence, if a country devotes more resources to 
the enhancement of existing institutions and/or construction of new ones, more positive 
externalities are feasible in terms of higher benefits and/or lower costs. Under the hypothesis 
that foreign investors (compared to their domestic counterparts) can more effectively channel 
their exports or investments between national markets, it is logical to infer that poor 
governance (e.g. corruption) is less detrimental to domestic transactions, compared to 
international transactions. The resulting differential effect of corruption motivates better 
incentives for improved governance. Therefore, compared to a country in autarky or isolation, 
a country that is open to the world is more likely to allocate more resources to enhance 
governance standards in the face of burgeoning globalisation.  
In the light of the above, governance is more endogenous than globalization because 
globalization is largely an external or exogenous factor. This sequence is logical because 
globalization is more likely to influence national governance than national governance can 
influence globalization, especially governments of developing countries.  The policy question 
addressed by this inquiry builds on gaps identified in two studies in the empirical literature 
that are closest to the present inquiry.  
 Lalountas, Manolas and Varouras (2011) have established that when confronted with 
globalisation, nations with higher income are comparatively more preoccupied with the 
8 
 
political and social dimensions of globalisation and therefore they enjoy positive externalities 
in terms of incentives for better measures in fighting corruption. On the other hand, countries 
with lower income are more concerned with the economic dimension of globalisation and 
therefore, the effect on corruption may be less apparent. Asongu (2014a) has confirmed the 
findings of Lalountas, Manolas and Varouras (2011) within a framework of African countries. 
This study extends this strand of the literature in three perspectives. First, we bundle six 
governance variables into four composite indicators in order to articulate an evolving 
paradigm in the conception of governance. Second, the empirical strategy is based on 
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions as opposed to Instrumental Variable Two Stage 
Least Squares used in the underlying literature (see Lalountas, Manolas and Varouras 2011; 
Asongu 2014a). This estimation technique enables the study to examine the governance-
globalisation nexus throughout the conditional distributions of governance. Therefore, this 
modelling approach articulates countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
governance. Third, the conception of globalisation in the context of this study is more 
comprehensive and holistic because it incorporates political, economic, social and general 
dimensions of the phenomenon.  
 In the light of the above, this study extends the extant empirical literature by 
answering the following policy questions: how globalisation affects governance when existing 
levels of governance matter? 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 This study examines a panel of 51 African countries with data from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and Vishny (2008), World Governance and World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank and Dreher,  Gaston, Martens and Van Boxem (2010) for the 
period 1996-2011. The periodicity is chosen because of constraints in data availability. For 
instance, good governance measurements from the World Bank Governance indicators are 
only available from 1996 while the latest year for other variables is 2011.  The dependent 
indicators are bundled into: economic governance (entailing regulation quality and 
government effectiveness); political governance (consisting of “voice and accountability” and 
political stability/non violence); institutional governance (comprised of the rule of law and 
corruption-control) and general governance. In Section 3.1.2 that follows, we discuss the 
bundling exercise which is done with principal component analysis.  
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The independent indicators are globalisation variables from Dreher,  Gaston, Martens 
and Van Boxem (2010).  They include the social, political, economic and general dimensions 
of globalisation. These globalisation indicators have been substantially employed in the 
literature (Figge and Martens 2014; Koosimile and Suping 2015; Asongu and Nwachukwu 
2017a, 2017b). Selected control variables that are consistent with recent governance literature 
(Lalountas, Manolas and Varouras 2011; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b, 2016c) include: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, foreign aid, public investment, inflation, middle 
income and English common law. The first-four are from World Bank Development 
indicators. Dummy variables on legal origins and income levels are respectively obtained 
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and Vishny (2008, p. 289) and the World Bank 
stratification of income categories4. Consistent with the literature, we expect economic 
prosperity in terms of GDP growth to influence governance positively because countries with 
high incomes are traditionally linked with better structures of governance (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2016b). Consistent with the same authors, high inflation can reduce standards of 
governance because it could be associated with inter alia: (i) disrespect of the rule of law; (ii) 
high levels of corruption in order to compensate for reduced purchasing power and (iii) 
political instability.  
The impacts of development assistance and public investment are debatable. The 
impact of public investment on governance depends on among others: the type of governance 
variable and the manner in which disbursed funds are managed. For example, funds that are 
allocated to provide public commodities could enhance economic governance. Meanwhile, if 
the disbursement of corresponding funds is related to corruption and mismanagement, it is 
very likely that the impact on institutional governance will be negative. On the perspective of 
foreign aid, while Okada and Samreth (2012) have concluded that it has a positive nexus with 
corruption in a broad sample of developing countries, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c) have 
established negative effects between development assistance and the six governance 
indicators from Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2011). English common law countries 
(compared with French civil law nations) are associated with higher levels of governance (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and Vishny 1998, 1999; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
                                                          
4
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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Silanes and  Shleifer  2003) while higher income countries in Africa (compared with their low 
income counterparts) enjoy better levels of governance (Asongu, 2012).  
 The definitions and sources of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, the summary 
statistics in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. From Appendix 
3, it is apparent that some of the control variables are not employed because of 
multicollinearity issues or high degrees of substitution. The unused control variables are: 
mobile phone penetration; secondary school enrolment and population growth. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 Consistent with the motivation on the need to employ composite measurements of 
institutional quality, we use PCA in order to bundle the six governance indicators form 
Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2011) into four composite variables, namely: general, political, 
institutional, economic governances. The technique which has been used in recent African 
governance literature (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b) is a statistical method that is 
employed to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of indicators that are 
uncorrelated and called principal components (PCs). The PCs represent a substantial variation 
of information in the combined constituent indicators.   
The Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion is employed to retain common factors. 
According to the criterion, only common factors which have an eigenvalue greater than the 
mean should be retained. As apparent in Table 1, the eigenvalue corresponding to General 
Governance (G.Gov) is 4.787, representing approximately 79% of the total information in the 
six governance variables. In the same vein, economic governance (Ecogov), political 
governance (Polgov) and institutional governance (Instgov) have eigenvalues (respectively 
total variations) of 1.863, 1.647 and 1.867 (93.1%, 82.3% and 93.3%).  In essence: (i) 
political governance (which comprises political stability/non-violence) is the election and 
replacement of political leaders; (ii) economic governance (entailing government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) is the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities and (iii) institutional governance (consisting of corruption-control 
and the rule of law) is the respect by citizens and the State of institutions that govern 
interactions between them.  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.385 0.370 0.412 0.426 0.440 0.412 0.797 0.797 4.787 
Second  PC 0.093 0.850 -0.364 -0.343 0.007 -0.140 0.072 0.870 0.437 
Third PC 0.862 -0.179 0.122 -0.192 -0.182 -0.373 0.058 0.929 0.353 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.823 0.823 1.647 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.176 1.000 0.352 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.931 0.931 1.863 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.068 1.000 0.137 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.933 0.933 1.867 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.066 1.000 0.132 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
  
 Some concerns have been documented on the quality of indicators obtained from 
initial regressions (see Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b). The issues raised are centred on the 
consistency, efficiency and inferential validity of estimated coefficients derived from second-
stage regressions. In accordance with Pagan (1984, 242), while two-step estimators produce 
efficient and consistent estimates, they do not produce many valid inferences. The issues on 
inferential validity have also been documented in a broad strand of contemporary literature on 
the subject (see Oxley and McAleer 1993; McKenzie and  McAleer 1997;  Ba and Ng 2006;  
Westerlund and Urbain  2013a).  
 With regards to the PC-framework of this inquiry, Westerlund and Urbain (2015, 
2013b) have built on previous studies (Pesaran 2006; Stock and Watson 2002; Bai 2003; Bai 
2009; Greenaway-McGrevy Han and Sul 2012) to conclude that PC-augmented regressions 
can engender normal inferences in as much as estimated coefficients converge to their real 
values at the following rate: NT  , (where T is the number of time series and N denotes the 
number of cross-sections). According to the authors, in order for such convergence to occur, T 
and N need to be sufficiently large. However, they do not explicitly disclose how “large 
should be large”. Two concerns related to this merit emphasis in this study. On the one hand, 
it is not very feasible to extend N much further because almost all African countries have 
been engaged. On the other hand, extending T is also not very feasible for two main reasons: 
(i) 1996 cannot be discounted further as the starting year because good governance indicators 
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from the World Bank are only available from 1996 and (ii) the end year is 2011 because of 
constraints in data availability at the time of the study. 
 In addition to the above justifications that are related to data availability constraints, 
recent empirical literature has employed PC-augmented variables with far lower values of N 
and T than in the current study. These studies include: (i) Asongu (2016b) on MINT (Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) countries and (ii) Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) on MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) countries 
 
3.2.2 Quantile regressions 
 In accordance with the motivation which is to assess the governance-globalisation 
relationship when existing levels of governance matter, the study is consistent with the 
literature on conditional determinants by employing a Quantile Regressions (QR) approach 
(Keonker and Hallock 2001; Billger and Goel 2009; Okada and Samreth 2012; Asongu 2013; 
Asongu et al., 2017). In essence, the QR method consists of examining the governance-
globalisation nexus throughout the conditional distributions of governance.  
 The existing literature on the governance-globalisation relationship has focused on 
investigating the nexus at the conditional mean of governance (Lalountas, Manolas and 
Varouras 2011). While mean effects are relevant, we complement the underlying literature by 
employing an estimation technique that accounts for existing levels of governance. Moreover, 
studies emphasising mean effects by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are based on the 
assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. This assumption does not hold for 
the QR approach because the technique is not based on the assumption of normally distributed 
error terms. Therefore, the approach enables this study to assess the globalisation-governance 
relationship with specific emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
governance. This  technique which is robust in the presence of outliers enables the assessment 
of parameter estimates at  multiple points of the conditional distribution of governance 
(Koenker and Bassett 1978).  
 We address the concern of endogeneity by using an Instrumental Variable QR 
(IVQR). The instrumentation procedure for globalisation is in Eq. (1) below. 
  titijti GG ,1,,   
 
  ,                                                                                            (1) 
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where, tiG , , is the globalisation  indicator of country i
 
at  period t ,    is a constant, 1, tiG , 
represents  globalisation   in country i
 
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term. The 
instrumentation procedure consists of regressing the globalisation independent variables of 
interest on their first lags and then saving the fitted values that are subsequently used as the 
main independent variables in Eq. (2). The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. The  th quantile estimator of 
governance is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem, which is presented 
without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (2) 
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)1(min
,                                             (2) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25th or 75th quartiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of governance or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                 (3) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of governance. For the model in Eq. (3), the 
dependent variable iy  is a governance indicator while ix  contains a constant term, GDP 
growth, foreign aid, public investment, inflation, Middle income and Common law.  
 Although the merits for the use of instrumental variable QR have been stated, it is 
important to acknowledge that some weaknesses may exist in applying this approach. For 
example, in the instrumental variable empirical strategy, it is assumed that there are zero 
correlations between the outcome variable and the instrument. While under linearity, such 
assumptions of zero correlations are plausible, with non-linear models (like the case of QR) 
such projections do not hold. This study is not irremediably damaged by this weakness. 
Moreover, the findings can still be useful for policy because the instrumental variable 
specification is not specified such that there is an assumption that the instruments do not 
influence the outcome variable. We have employed a step-wise estimation strategy. Within 
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this framework, the fitted or instrumented variables are first derived and saved before being 
used as the independent variables of interest in the main equation. It is important to note that 
the underlying assumption (.i.e. of zero correlations between instruments and dependent 
variables) is more relevant when the specification of a model requires the following variables 
to be clearly articulated: (i) dependent; (ii) endogenous explaining and (iii) instrumental 
variables. An example of a model that requires the underlying identification process for 
proper specification is the Generalised Method of Moments.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively present findings corresponding to political governance, 
economic governance, institutional governance and general governance. Each table is 
presented in four panels: the first-two on the top present “political globalisation”- and 
“economic globalisation”-related regressions in respectively the left-hand-side and right-
hand-side. Consistent differences in globalisation estimated coefficients between OLS and 
quintiles (in terms of sign, significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of 
adopted empirical strategy. 
 The following findings can be established from Table 2 on the relationship between 
political governance and globalisation dynamics. First, globalisation positively affects 
political governance. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude in the 
bottom quantiles of the governance distribution, compared to top quantiles, with a thin 
exception of top quantiles in “political globalisation”-related regressions in the top-left-hand-
side that are not significant. Third, the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on the nexus between 
economic governance and globalisation dynamics. First, globalisation has a positive influence 
on economic governance. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of magnitude 
in the top quantiles of the governance distribution, compared to bottom quantiles, with a thin 
exception of top quantiles in “social globalisation”-related regressions in the bottom-left-
hand-side for which the distinction is not apparent. Third, most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on the effect of globalisation 
dynamics on institutional governance. First, globalisation has a positive effect on institutional 
governance for the most part. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of 
magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the institutional governance distribution, compared to 
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top quantiles. There is a small exception of “economic globalisation”-related regressions in 
the top- right-hand-side for which estimates are not significant in the bottom quantiles. Third, 
most the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
 
Table 2: Political governance and globalisation   
             
 Dependent variable: Political  Governance Index 
  
 Political Globalisation (Polglob) Economic Globalisation (Ecoglob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -1.260*** -2.26*** -2.24*** -1.70*** -0.098 -0.65*** -1.92*** -3.15*** -2.90*** -2.46*** -1.51*** -0.039 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.747) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.896) 
Polglob(IV) 0.006** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.012*** -0.005 -0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.001) (0.000) (0.170) (0.206)       
Ecoglob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.019* 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.010* 
       (0.000) (0.008) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
GDP growth 0.0008 0.018 0.010 -0.010 0.004 0.014 -0.002 0.009 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.011 
 (0.937) (0.270) (0.487) (0.305) (0.693) (0.149) (0.852) (0.559) (0.907) (0.457) (0.360) (0.260) 
Foreign aid  0.012 0.007 0.008 0.019*** 0.015** -0.020*** 0.008 0.006 0.021 0.012 -0.007 -0.022*** 
 (0.141) (0.487) (0.319) (0.008) (0.021) (0.002) (0.327) (0.527) (0.149) (0.214) (0.337) (0.001) 
Public 
Investment 
0.058*** 0.040 0.044** 0.035*** 0.100*** 0.137*** 0.086*** 0.051** 0.079** 0.081*** 0.136*** 0.150*** 
 (0.001) (0.130) (0.010) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.00006 
*** 
-0.000 -0.00003 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
0.000 -0.00002 -0.00004 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
-
0.00008*** 
 (0.000) (0.722) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.837) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  0.391*** 0.110 0.429*** 0.614*** 0.539*** 0.361* 0.240 -0.196 0.249 0.571*** 0.285 0.245 
 (0.006) (0.602) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.068) (0.123) (0.343) (0.303) (0.005) (0.118) (0.163) 
Common law  0.854*** 0.778*** 0.937*** 1.081*** 1.066*** 0.695*** 0.635*** 0.641*** 1.048*** 0.656*** 0.553*** 0.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.157 0.057 0.097 0.106 0.125 0.186 0.229 0.112 0.114 0.148 0.172 0.212 
Fisher  18.03***      27.42***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 420 420 420 420 420 420 
             
             
 Social Globalisation (Socglob) General Globalisation  (Glob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -2.648*** -3.890*** -
3.372*** 
-
2.655*** 
-
2.203*** 
-0.666*** -
3.065*** 
-
4.758*** 
-
4.169*** 
-
2.952*** 
-
2.197*** 
-0.738** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
Socglob(IV) 0.070*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.041*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Glob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.054*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth 0.022** 0.018* 0.025* 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.026** 0.011 0.005 -0.003 0.0004 
 (0.023) (0.069) (0.075) (0.267) (0.117) (0.170) (0.382) (0.038) (0.313) (0.566) (0.824) (0.958) 
Foreign aid  0.020*** 0.013*** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.033*** -0.012* 0.019** 0.011 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.012 -0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.032) (0.489) (0.003) (0.000) (0.141) (0.012) 
Public 
Investment 
0.055*** 0.045*** 0.041** 0.038*** 0.074*** 0.148*** 0.058*** 0.028 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.094*** 0.159*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.00006 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
-0.00003 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00001 
** 
-0.00003 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  -0.381*** -0.692*** -
0.572*** 
0.165 -0.210 -0.425*** 0.026 -0.477** 0.020 0.373*** 0.071 0.037 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.290) (0.127) (0.006) (0.863) (0.037) (0.883) (0.003) (0.721) (0.843) 
Common law  0.412*** 0.305*** 0.400*** 0.707*** 0.598*** 0.302** 0.556*** 0.647*** 0.667*** 0.778*** 0.602*** 0.516*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.356 0.269 0.215 0.209 0.204 0.223 0.266 0.180 0.168 0.158 0.158 0.193 
Fisher  63.72***      37.85***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile 
Regressions). Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where governance is least. IV: Instrumented Variable. Contrary to quantile 
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regressions, OLS are based on the mean values of the outcome variable. Including OLS estimates is therefore to compare estimates based on 
mean values of the outcome variable with estimates based on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
 
Table 3: Economic governance and globalisation   
             
 Dependent variable: Economic  Governance Index 
  
 Political Globalisation (Polglob) Economic Globalisation (Ecoglob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -
1.619*** 
-
2.057*** 
-
2.089*** 
-
1.820*** 
-
0.651*** 
0.051 -0.197 -
1.032*** 
-
0.846*** 
-
0.955*** 
0.158 0.577*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.758) (0.407) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.537) (0.000) 
Polglob(IV) 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.016*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Ecoglob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 -0.008* -0.006 0.016** 0.017*** 0.015*** 
       (0.677) (0.077) (0.189) (0.023) (0.002) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.022 0.029** 0.006 
 (0.337) (0.254) (0.730) (0.593) (0.220) (0.834) (0.295) (0.306) (0.620) (0.146) (0.011) (0.327) 
Foreign aid  0.009 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.007* -0.002 -0.011** -0.005 0.008 0.028*** 0.017*** 
 (0.218) (0.792) (0.858) (0.002) (0.000) (0.054) (0.723) (0.019) (0.370) (0.373) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public 
Investment 
-0.020** -0.012 0.008 -0.023 -
0.055*** 
-0.047 
*** 
-0.027** 0.013 0.009 -0.039* -0.114*** -0.075*** 
 (0.039) (0.134) (0.325) (0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.297) (0.504) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.00006 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
-0.00004 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
-0.00003 
*** 
-0.00007 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle 
Income  
0.274** 0.078 0.204*** 0.619*** 0.376*** 0.387*** 0.179 -0.095 0.052 0.288 0.450*** 0.544*** 
 (0.011) (0.201) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.211) (0.644) (0.121) (0.001) (0.000) 
Common law  1.166*** 1.421*** 1.277*** 1.101*** 0.964*** 0.761*** 1.037*** 1.591*** 1.367*** 0.924*** 0.443*** 0.459*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.392 0.321 0.310 0.212 0.208 0.270 0.275 0.282 0.253 0.134 0.159 0.233 
Fisher  52.71***      31.82***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 420 420 420 420 420 420 
             
             
 Social Globalisation (Socglob) General Globalisation  (Glob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -
1.654*** 
-
2.465*** 
-
2.149*** 
-
1.921*** 
-
0.886*** 
0.063 -
2.356*** 
-
2.144*** 
-
2.653*** 
-
3.171*** 
-1.854*** -0.720*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.644) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Socglob(IV) 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.032*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Glob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.051*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.044*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.019** 0.015 0.010* 0.028*** 0.013 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.019 0.004 0.0005 
 (0.010) (0.100) (0.063) (0.003) (0.132) (0.490) (0.182) (0.193) (0.117) (0.139) (0.683) (0.911) 
Foreign aid  0.010 0.001 -0.0007 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.010 -0.001 -0.0001 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 
 (0.134) (0.704) (0.864) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) (0.769) (0.981) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public 
Investment 
-
0.027*** 
-
0.032*** 
-0.015** -
0.038*** 
-
0.061*** 
-
0.050*** 
-0.024** -0.014 0.008 -0.020 -0.068*** -0.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.108) (0.314) (0.178) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.00006 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
-0.00003 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
-0.00004 
*** 
-
0.00007*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle 
Income  
-
0.375*** 
-0.027 -
0.266*** 
-0.289** -
0.517*** 
0.219*** -0.110 0.080 -0.071 0.117 0.272** 0.036 
 (0.000) (0.837) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.005) (0.288) (0.274) (0.446) (0.453) (0.033) (0.549) 
Common law  0.793*** 0.915*** 1.068*** 0.969*** 0.564*** 0.747*** 0.859*** 1.269*** 1.132*** 0.909*** 0.316** 0.439*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.468 0.369 0.374 0.297 0.231 0.256 0.437 0.302 0.312 0.272 0.235 0.296 
Fisher  70.33***      68.38***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile 
Regressions). Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where governance is least. IV: Instrumented Variable. Contrary to quantile 
regressions, OLS are based on the mean values of the outcome variable. Including OLS estimates is therefore to compare estimates based on 
mean values of the outcome variable with estimates based on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
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Table 4: Institutional governance and globalisation   
             
 Dependent variable: Institutional  Governance Index 
  
 Political Globalisation (Polglob) Economic Globalisation (Ecoglob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -1.808*** -
3.804*** 
-
2.953*** 
-
1.908*** 
-
0.765*** 
0.986*** -
1.675*** 
-
1.889*** 
-
1.856*** 
-
1.947*** 
-
1.401*** 
-0.556** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) 
Polglob(IV) 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.002 -
0.010*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.539) (0.000)       
Ecoglob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.011* -0.005 -0.002 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.014** 
       (0.071) (0.573) (0.669) (0.006) (0.000) (0.013) 
GDP growth -0.004 0.020 -0.005 -0.015 0.012 0.017** 0.002 0.009 0.010 0.033** 0.026** 0.042*** 
 (0.776) (0.209) (0.766) (0.116) (0.202) (0.024) (0.871) (0.769) (0.589) (0.016) (0.049) (0.004) 
Foreign aid  0.011 0.010 0.007 0.012* -0.011* 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -
0.018*** 
-
0.027*** 
 (0.199) (0.378) (0.523) (0.056) (0.051) (0.518) (0.829) (0.930) (0.562) (0.367) (0.007) (0.000) 
Public 
Investment 
0.053** 0.042** 0.063*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.043*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.119*** 0.103*** 0.116*** 0.101*** 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.0001 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.00007 
*** 
-0.0004 
*** 
-0.00004 
*** 
-0.00004 
*** 
-0.00007 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  0.836*** 0.028 0.085 0.970*** 1.478*** 1.325*** 0.789*** -0.081 0.584*** 0.938*** 1.032*** 1.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.850) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.744) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common law  0.932*** 0.223** 0.595*** 0.816*** 0.691*** 0.912*** 0.736*** 0.672*** 0.973*** 0.514*** 0.332** 0.588*** 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.255 0.122 0.130 0.144 0.214 0.344 0.325 0.092 0.165 0.186 0.265 0.370 
Fisher  31.57***      33.57***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 420 420 420 420 420 420 
             
             
 Social Globalisation (Socglob) General Globalisation  (Glob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -3.192*** -
3.592*** 
-
3.533*** 
-
3.285*** 
-
2.812*** 
-
1.939*** 
-3.717 
*** 
-4.202 
*** 
-4.462 
*** 
-
3.639*** 
-
3.383*** 
-
1.915*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Socglob(IV) 0.087*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Glob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.020* 0.022 0.024 0.010 0.022* 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.010 
 (0.098) (0.273) (0.161) (0.178) (0.073) (0.391) (0.741) (0.476) (0.571) (0.694) (0.651) (0.415) 
Foreign aid  0.020** 0.016 0.019* 0.016*** 0.009 -0.001 0.018* 0.004 0.021** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.015** 
 (0.018) (0.215) (0.068) (0.001) (0.206) (0.853) (0.062) (0.726) (0.020) (0.009) (0.000) (0.028) 
Public 
Investment 
0.047*** 0.014 0.019 0.072*** 0.098*** 0.089*** 0.051*** 0.046** 0.036** 0.047** 0.096*** 0.102*** 
 (0.003) (0.495) (0.257) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.025) (0.027) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.00009 
*** 
-0.00005 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.0008 
*** 
-0.00006 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  -0.133 -0.394** -0.185 -0.247** 0.169 0.213 0.370** -0.316* 0.198 0.531*** 0.666*** 1.167*** 
 (0.290) (0.031) (0.308) (0.016) (0.319) (0.262) (0.010) (0.098) (0.169) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common law  0.377*** 0.243** 0.288** 0.502*** 0.136 0.081 0.554*** 0.580*** 0.410*** 0.497*** 0.429*** 0.739*** 
 (0.000) (0.040) (0.038) (0.000) (0.384) (0.642) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.517 0.279 0.315 0.313 0.315 0.379 0.391 0.160 0.208 0.210 0.263 0.346 
Fisher  108.05***      61.37***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile 
Regressions). Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where governance is least. IV: Instrumented Variable. Contrary to quantile 
regressions, OLS are based on the mean values of the outcome variable. Including OLS estimates is therefore to compare estimates based on 
mean values of the outcome variable with estimates based on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
 
The following findings can be established from Table 5 on the effect of globalisation 
dynamics on general governance. First, globalisation has a positive effect on general 
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governance, for the most part. Second, the effect of globalisation is higher in terms of 
magnitude in the bottom quantiles of the general governance distribution, compared to top 
quantiles.  A small exception is in “economic globalisation”-related regressions in the top-
right-hand-side for which estimates are not significant in the bottom quantiles. Third, most the 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
Table 5: General governance and globalisation   
             
 Dependent variable: General Governance Index 
  
 Political Globalisation (Polglob) Economic Globalisation (Ecoglob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -
2.638*** 
-
4.652*** 
-
3.688*** 
-
3.119*** 
-
1.041*** 
1.860*** -
2.529*** 
-
3.525*** 
-
2.830*** 
-
3.785*** 
-1.932*** -0.797** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) 
Polglob(IV) 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.006 -
0.017*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000)       
Ecoglob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.025** 0.010 0.001 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
       (0.014) (0.514) (0.888) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.001 0.033 -0.017 -0.010 0.017 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.051** 0.009 0.009 
 (0.926) (0.366) (0.304) (0.606) (0.184) (0.396) (0.777) (0.850) (0.865) (0.015) (0.632) (0.555) 
Foreign aid  0.017 0.001 0.014 0.035*** -0.014 -0.015** 0.0002 0.0001 0.005 -0.009 -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.186) (0.942) (0.190) (0.035) (0.104) (0.010) (0.981) (0.992) (0.684) (0.449) (0.005) (0.000) 
Public Investment 0.075*** 0.045 0.055*** 0.048** 0.168*** 0.084*** 0.131*** 0.118** 0.122*** 0.155*** 0.193*** 0.129*** 
 (0.007) (0.399) (0.006) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.0001 
*** 
-0.0005 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0006 
*** 
-0.00009 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-
0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  0.975*** 0.027 0.651*** 1.164*** 1.548*** 1.245*** 0.813*** -0.269 0.636*** 0.823*** 1.131*** 0.964*** 
 (0.000) (0.931) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common law  1.492*** 0.484** 1.850*** 1.372*** 1.177*** 1.467*** 1.150*** 0.883*** 1.963*** 0.931*** 0.584*** 0.687*** 
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.245 0.091 0.160 0.137 0.173 0.342 0.293 0.084 0.163 0.157 0.226 0.366 
Fisher  28.87***      31.40***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 420 420 420 420 420 420 
             
             
 Social Globalisation (Socglob) General Globalisation  (Glob) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -
4.515*** 
-
5.697*** 
-
5.144*** 
-
4.847*** 
-
3.885*** 
-
1.634*** 
-
5.472*** 
-
7.608*** 
-
6.243*** 
-
5.926*** 
-4.278*** -2.980*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Socglob(IV) 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.072*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Glob (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.037** 0.035 0.046** 0.008 0.018 0.029* 0.014 0.027 0.020 0.009 -0.007 -0.026* 
 (0.027) (0.253) (0.016) (0.625) (0.289) (0.077) (0.409) (0.317) (0.395) (0.538) (0.688) (0.077) 
Foreign aid  0.029** 0.028 0.025* 0.046*** 0.002 0.011 0.027* 0.024 0.036** 0.061*** 0.007 0.023** 
 (0.016) (0.156) (0.052) (0.000) (0.839) (0.246) (0.055) (0.285) (0.024) (0.000) (0.523) (0.011) 
Public Investment 0.066*** 0.037 0.038* 0.076*** 0.146*** 0.128*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.035 0.045** 0.151*** 0.191*** 
 (0.001) (0.137) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.123) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.0001 
*** 
-0.00008 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income  -0.434** -0.619** -
0.641*** 
-0.054 -0.379 0.440** 0.265 -0.492 0.156 0.752*** 0.607** 1.060*** 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.007) (0.804) (0.132) (0.046) (0.215) (0.124) (0.558) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
Common law  0.685*** 0.331* 0.781*** 1.024*** 0.730*** 0.740*** 0.917*** 1.015*** 1.004*** 0.897*** 0.624*** 1.238*** 
 (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.500 0.289 0.320 0.300 0.270 0.367 0.391 0.181 0.230 0.221 0.225 0.342 
Fisher  96.43**      62.79***      
Observations  449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
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***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile 
Regressions). Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where governance is least. IV: Instrumented Variable. Contrary to quantile 
regressions, OLS are based on the mean values of the outcome variable. Including OLS estimates is therefore to compare estimates based on 
mean values of the outcome variable with estimates based on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
 
 
5. Concluding implication and future research direction  
This study attempted to address the research question: how does globalization affect 
governance when existing levels of governance matter? To do so, I have used: (i) four 
bundled governance indicators and four globalization (political, economic, social, and 
general) variables; and (ii) instrumental variable Quantile Regressions. The methodological 
reasons underpinning my choice of this estimation technique is that blanket governance-
globalization policies are not very likely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels 
of governance and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate, and high levels 
of governance. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 51 African countries for the 
period 1996-2011.  
Based on the findings, globalization does indeed promote good governance. Second, 
for the most part, the effect of globalization is higher in terms of magnitude in the bottom 
quantiles of political, institutional, and general governance distributions. Third, and 
overwhelmingly, the impact of globalization is higher in terms of magnitude in the top 
quantiles of the economic governance distribution. It is important to emphasize how these 
findings improve scholarly understanding of the conception and definition of governance in 
the light of the motivation of this paper which is to articulate an evolving paradigm shift in the 
conception of governance. Prior to these established findings, the positive association between 
general governance (political, economic, institutional and general) and globalization would 
have been lacking in empirical validity. Hence, we have provided the empirical validity with 
which to substantiate the connection between these concepts of governance and globalization. 
This clarification is particularly useful because it has been argued by Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017c) that the concept of “general governance” is used without empirical 
validity in the literature. We have shown from the findings that the positive association 
between globalization and general governance withstands empirical scrutiny. Furthermore, the 
concept of general governance used in this paper entails all the six dimensions of governance 
from World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
The above discourse also extends to the use of other composite governance concepts. 
For instance, empirical validity is also important because constituents of the composite 
governance variables we have employed translate different perspectives in the real world. For 
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instance, political governance has often conflated been with “strong democracy” (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016d). Unfortunately “strong democracy” is only the “voice and 
accountability” dimension of political governance. Let me substantiate this perspective with 
an example: while most African countries may be better in terms of “voice and 
accountability” when compared to China, China comparatively enjoys more political stability 
which is important for the effects of globalization on political governance. Hence, this study 
also falls within the framework of a theory-building exercise by arguing that since 
constituents of employed composite governance indicators are heterogeneous across 
geographical and political contexts, it  is important to always substantiate policy implications  
with empirical findings that are void of conceptual conflation.  
In the light of the findings, this inquiry hopes to contribute to the literature in its 
assessment of the role of globalization on governance by using novel concepts of governance 
with particular emphasis on countries with low, intermediate, and high levels of governance. 
These findings improve the extant literature which has established that: institutional reforms 
in Africa have been driven by globalization (McMillan 2013); globalization reduces 
corruption (Wei 2000; Lalountas, Manolas, and Varouras 2011; Asongu 2014a); poor 
governance has escalated as a result of globalization (Shapiro and Levine 2015); globalization 
of capital may provide wrong incentives to governance, leading to misgovernance and 
indiscipline (Krugman 1999; Rodrik and Subramanian 2009; Stiglitz 2010); trade openness 
improves the quality of institutions (Islam and Montenegro 2002; Busse and Gröning 2008), 
and globalization influences state and nonstate (Hu and Chan 2002) or domestic institutions 
(Ju and Wei 2011). In essence, the findings hope to provide the beginnings of a holistic 
approach to the conception and measurement of governance that employs a plethora of 
globalization indicators while conditioning the investigation on existing levels of governance.  
One of the main policy implications of this study is that existing levels of governance 
influence how globalization affects governance standards. To put this implication into greater 
perspective, from the angle of political governance: (i) the positive effect of political 
globalization on political governance is apparent exclusively in  countries with below-median 
levels of political governance while (ii) for  the other globalization dimensions (economic, 
social and general), the positive effect on political governance is lower in terms of magnitude 
in countries with above-median levels of political governance. It follows that, countries with 
averagely lower initial levels of political governance benefit more in terms of political 
governance when compared to their counterparts with averagely higher levels of political 
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governance. In summary, the positive responsiveness of political governance to globalization 
is a decreasing function of above-median levels of political governance. The tendency or 
comparative advantage of countries with below-median levels of political governance can be 
extended to other investigated linkages between globalization and governance. Exceptions to 
this extension include, the: (i) effect of economic globalization on economic, institutional and 
general governance and (ii)  impact of political globalization on economic governance.  
In the light of the above, compared to countries with higher levels of governance, for 
the most part, globalization would benefit countries with lower levels of governance more. It 
is important to clarify why below-median countries in terms of political governance more 
positively respond to the positive effect of globalization on political/general governance when 
compared to the their above-median counterparts. We first begin by categorizing sampled 
countries into above- and below-median categories in terms of political governance. After 
which, distinguishing features of the categories are identified. For the computation, the choice 
of political governance over other types of governance  indicators  is because above- and 
below-median tendencies of the findings of political governance are broadly consistent with 
those of general governance. Whereas the median of political governance is -0.115, we notice 
that some countries within the sampled period may identify with both the below-median and 
above-median categories. In order for countries to be exclusively categorized as either above 
or below the median, we compute the average value of political governance for each country 
and compare the computed values with the underlying median of  -0.115. The resulting 
above-median category which consists of 39 countries include:  Algeria; Angola;  Benin; 
Botswana; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Cape Verde;  Comoros; Djibouti; Egypt; Equatorial 
Guinea;  Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius;  Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; 
Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Swaziland; Togo; Tunisia; 
Uganda and Zambia. The corresponding below-median countries are 12: Burundi; Central 
African Republic; Chad; The Democratic Republic of Congo; Congo Republic; Côte d’Ivoire;  
Eritrea; Ethiopia; Guinea; Somalia; Sudan  and Zimbabwe.  
In the light of the above, it is reasonable to hypothesize   that the main characteristics 
in below-median are civil wars or political instability.  As shown by Asongu (2014b), 
compared to the rest of the world, political strife, conflicts and civil wars have substantially 
affected governance standards in Africa: Angola (1975-2002); Burundi (1993-2005); Chad 
(2005-2010); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); Liberia (1999-2003); the Congo Democratic 
22 
 
Republic; Sudan (with carnages in Durfur); Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire (a resurrected crisis in 
2011 after the 1999 coup d’état and 2002-2007 civil war) and the Central African Republic 
(with waves of failed coup d’états that occurred  between 1996-2003 and the Bush War of 
2004- 2007). The author articulates that prior to the Arab Spring (which is consistent with the 
periodicity employed in this study), seven of the nine cases of total chaos and societal 
breakdown known in recent history were registered in Africa: Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Zaire/Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (with the exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria). 
It is important to note that countries with above-median levels of political stability 
which have witnessed substantial political instability in the stylized facts from Asongu 
(2014b),   largely experienced political turmoil before 2003. Hence,  in the light of the 
sampled periodicity (1996-2001),  these countries do not weigh substantially in contradicting 
the logic behind the narratives, notably: that political stability and civil wars are the main 
distinguishing features between the identified below-median and above-median categories.  
This narrative is further substantiated by the fact that there are missing observations in World 
Governance indicators for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. It follows from above that, the 
countries which  have experienced political instability and conflicts are more likely to enjoy 
the positive benefits of globalization in improving political/general governance when 
compared with their counterparts that have enjoyed relative political stability. The explanation 
is intuitive because post-conflict countries usually experience more changes of development 
indicators, compared to corresponding changes in countries that have experienced relative 
political stability (Beegle et al., 2016).  
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing what channels explain 
this difference in governance benefits from globalization. We have proposed the channels of 
wars and civil conflicts. However, it is important to substantiate the perspective with more 
robust empirical validity that directly engages indicators of civil war and political conflict as 
exogenous mechanisms.   
Of the four reasons motivating this study, three have already been discussed in this 
concluding section in the light of findings, namely: (i) an evolving paradigm in the conception 
of governance; (ii) gaps and debates in the literature and (iii) need to account for initial levels 
of governance. In the light of the above clarifications, we conclude by articulating the 
connection of the findings with the missing fourth motivation of poverty reduction.  Given  
the consensus on the role of good governance in human development (Efobi 2015; Fosu 2013; 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014; Fonchingong 2014), in the post-2015 sustainable 
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development era,  sampled countries that adopt inclusive globalization policies are very likely 
to enjoy inclusive development due to enhanced globalization-driven governance.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Political 
Globalisation 
Polglob “This captures the extent of political globalisation in terms of 
number of foreign embassies in a country, membership in 
internatonal orgnisations, participation in UN security”.  
 
Dreher, Gaston, 
Martens and Van 
Boxem (2010) 
 
    
Economic Ecoglob “Overall economic globalisation (considers both the flow and Dreher, Gaston, 
Martens and Van 
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Globalisation the restrictions in a given country to derive this). The higher, 
the better social globalisation”. 
Boxem (2010) 
 
    
Social  
Globalisation 
Socglob “Overall scores for the countries extent of social 
globalisation. The higher the better socially globalised the 
country”. 
Dreher, Gaston, 
Martens and Van 
Boxem (2010) 
 
    
Globalisation  Glob This is an overall index that contains economic globalisation, 
social globalisation and political globalisation 
Dreher, Gaston, 
Martens and Van 
Boxem (2010) 
 
    
Education  Educ Secondary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population 
growth  
Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment Pub. Ivt. Gross Public Investment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Annual Consumer Price Inflation  World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. WGI: World Governance Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2011) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.572 0.954 -3.304 1.189 612 
Voice & Accountability  -0.709 0.730 -2.178 1.009 612 
Political Governance  0.000 1.273 -3.323 2.790 612 
Government Effectiveness  -0.731 0.639 -2.454 0.876 662 
Regulation Quality  -0.708 0.654 -2.663 0.846 612 
Economic Governance  -0.0009 1.048 -2.252 2.458 611 
Rule of Law -0.708 0.683 1.048 -2.525 612 
Control of Corruption  -0.600 0.601 -2.061 1.255 611 
Institutional Governance -0.002 1.368 -3.584 3.596 611 
General Governance -0.004 1.985 -5.535 4.819 611 
Political Globalisation (IV)   58.696 17.576 22.439 93.575 765 
Economic Globalisation (IV) 44.991 12.643 14.041 84.229 645 
Social Globalisation (IV) 28.865 11.113 6.582 65.004 765 
Globalisation (IV) 41.775 9.881 18.774 68.453 756 
Education(SSE) 40.941 26.892 4.022 123.893 491 
Mobile phone penetration  19.829 29.390 0.000 171.515 811 
GDP growth  4.863 7.297 -32.832 106.279 792 
Population growth  2.317 1.007 -1.081 9.770 816 
Foreign aid   10.212 12.245 -0.251 147.054 791 
Public Investment  7.491 4.692 0.000 43.011 713 
Inflation  54.723 925.774 -9.797 24411.03 717 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  IV: Instrumental Variable.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 286) 
                      
Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance  Globalisation Control Variables    
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov IVPolglob IVEcoglob IVSocglob IVGlob SSE Mobile GDPg Popg Aid Pub.Ivt. Inflation  
1.000 0.704 0.913 0.666 0.708 0.453 0.735 0.786 0.782 0.864 -0.041 0.433 0.553 0.470 0.414 0.283 -0.072 -0.352 -0.167 0.140 -0.188 PS 
 1.000 0.927 0.694 0.742 0.397 0.707 0.776 0.763 0.866 0.044 0.390 0.460 0.446 0.419 0.234 -0.067 -0.215 -0.071 0.145 -0.104 VA 
  1.000 0.735 0.787 0.462 0.776 0.845 0.834 0.938 0.019 0.427 0.540 0.491 0.440 0.280 -0.072 -0.296 -0.117 0.157 -0.156 Polgov 
   1.000 0.877 0.634 0.867 0.885 0.905 0.886 0.199 0.434 0.705 0.662 0.678 0.407 -0.037 -0.484 -0.294 0.472 -0.129 GE 
    1.000 0.723 0.810 0.855 0.859 0.910 0.189 0.438 0.707 0.661 0.615 0.420 -0.098 -0.398 -0.325 -0.043 -0.227 RQ 
     1.000 0.545 0.598 0.586 0.620 0.208 0.264 0.586 0.521 0.409 0.315 -0.102 -0.340 -0.243 -0.295 -0.228 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.876 0.971 0.916 -0.032 0.437 0.664 0.530 0.613 0.353 -0.101 -0.531 -0.216 0.133 -0.154 CC 
       1.000 0.964 0.953 0.118 0.430 0.729 0.632 0.646 0.391 -0.069 -0.484 -0.259 0.118 -0.173 RL 
        1.000 0.964 0.042 0.446 0.716 0.596 0.650 0.384 -0.084 -0.523 -0.246 0.128 -0.168 Instgov 
         1.000 0.069 0.461 0.689 0.605 0.596 0.372 -0.088 -0.439 -0.224 0.101 -0.188 G.gov 
          1.000 -0.150 0.155 0.489 0.221 0.258 -0.081 0.051 -0.214 -0.103 -0.100 IVPolglob 
           1.000 0.518 0.696 0.573 0.514 0.058 -0.497 -0.416 0.015 0.205 IVEcoglob 
            1.000 0.826 0.795 0.590 -0.187 -0.753 -0.520 -0.170 -0.160 IVSocglob 
             1.000 0.789 0.678 -0.099 -0.594 -0.572 -0.124 -0.019 IVGlob 
              1.000 0.622 -0.130 -0.699 -0.594 -0.067 -0.097 SSE 
               1.000 -0.106 -0.440 -0.372 -0.021 -0.087 Mobile 
                1.000 0.213 0.090 0.241 0.027 GDPg 
                 1.000 0.489 0.086 0.086 Popg 
                  1.000 0.307 0.094 Aid 
                   1.000 0.015 Pub. Ivt. 
                    1.000 Inflation 
                      
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: 
Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. IV: Instrumented value. Polgov: Political Globalisation. Ecoglob: Economic Globalisation. Socglob: Social Globalisation.  Glob: 
Globalisation. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration.  GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth.  Popg: Population growth.  Aid: Foreign aid.  Pub. Ivt: Public Investment.  
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